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Introduction
Secret sharing schemes were introduced by both Blakley [2] and Shamir [15] independently in 1979 as a solution for safeguarding cryptographic keys and have been studied extensively in the literature. In Shamir's ( , ) t n secret sharing scheme, we denote it as a ( , ) t n SS, the secret s is divided into n shares by a dealer and is shared among n shareholders in such a way that any t or more than t shares can reconstruct the secret; but fewer than t shares cannot obtain any information about the secret s .
In 1985, Chor et al. [5] presented the notion of VSS. In VSS, shareholders are able to verify that their shares are consistent without revealing their shares and the secret. There are vast research papers on the VSS in the literature. Based to security assumptions, we can classify VSS into two different types, schemes that are computationally secure and schemes that are unconditionally secure. For example, Feldman [7] and Pedersen [13] developed non-interactive VSSs based on cryptographic commitment schemes. The security of Feldman's VSS is based on the hardness of solving discrete logarithm, while the privacy of Pedersen's VSS is unconditionally secure and the correctness of the shares depends on a computational assumption. Benaloh [3] proposed an interactive VSS scheme and it is unconditionally secure. Stinson et al. [16] proposed an unconditionally secure VSS and later, Patra et al. [12] proposed a generalized VSS scheme; but D'Arco and Stinson [6] showed that these two unconditionally secure VSS schemes can be easily broken. Recently, Peng [14] proposed verifiable secret sharing based on computational assumption and its privacy is unconditionally secure. Some papers [5, 13] focus on publicly verifiable secret sharing.
In some earlier VSS schemes [3, 7, 13] , all shareholders work together to verify their shares. These shareholders are supposed to act honestly in the VSS. The VSS is used to verify shares generated by the dealer. However, even if some shareholders act dishonestly, other honest shareholders can verify that there exist invalid shares; but cannot identify who present invalid shares (i.e., invalid shares can caused by the dealer or by dishonest shareholders). Later, another type of VSS [8] was defined. In this type of VSS, it is assumed that shareholders may be corrupted by an adversary. The VSS enables honest shareholders to identify dishonest shareholders if a minority of shareholders has been corrupted. Furthermore, the honest shareholders can still reconstruct the secret under this situation. Since this type of VSS can tolerate corrupted shareholders in the secret reconstruction, the verification becomes more complicate (i.e., several rounds of local communication [1, [8] [9] [10] 12] ) and expensive (i.e., a private channel for exchange information between every pair of shareholders). However, the objective of both types of VSS is same. That is to enable shareholders to verify the consistency of their shares.
In our proposed VSS scheme, the dealer follows Shamir's ( , ) t n SS scheme to select two polynomials and use them to generate one private share and one verification share for each shareholder. Later, shareholders use the linear combination of these two shares can verify the t  consistency of private shares. There is no need to exchange any secret information among shareholders. We propose the following VSS scheme to protect the secret and private shares unconditionally.
In this paper, we propose a novel approach to design an efficient verifiable secret sharing scheme based on Shamir's ( , ) t n secret sharing scheme. In our proposed VSS scheme, the dealer follows Shamir's ( , ) t n SS scheme to select two polynomials and use them to generate one private share and one verification share for each shareholder. Later, shareholders use the linear combination of these two shares can verify the t  consistency of private shares. There is no need to exchange any secret information among shareholders. The secret and all shares in our proposed scheme can be protected unconditionally.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we introduce some preliminaries. In Section 3, we propose our unconditionally secure verifiable secret sharing scheme. Conclusion is in Section 4.
Preliminaries

Shamir's (t, n) SS Scheme
In Shamir's ( , )
t n SS scheme based on a linear polynomial, there are n shareholders Shamir's ( , ) t n SS scheme satisfies security requirements of a secret sharing scheme, that are, (a) with knowledge of any t or more than t shares can reconstruct the secret s ; and (b) with knowledge of fewer than t shares cannot get any information about the secret s . Shamir's scheme is unconditionally secure since the scheme satisfies these two requirements without making any computational assumption. For more information on this scheme, readers can refer to the original paper [15] .
t  Consistency of Shares
Benaloh [3] presented a notion of t  consistency to convince whether shares are verifiable or not. We describe this notion as follows.
Unconditionally Secure Verifiable Secret Sharing Scheme Changlu Lin, Lein Harn Definition 1 ( t  consistency [3] ): A set of n shares 1 2 , , , n s s s  is said to be t  consistent, if any subset of t of the n shares reconstructs the same secret. Benaloh [3] claimed that the shares, 1 2 , , , n s s s  , in Shamir's ( , ) t n SS are t  consistent if and only if the interpolation of the points, 1 2 (1, ),(2, ), ,( , ) n s s n s  , yields a polynomial of degree at most 1 t  . This implies that if the interpolated polynomial of n shares is with degree at most 1 t  , then all shares are t -consistent.
Verifiable Secret Sharing Scheme
In this section, we use the property of t-consistency as we described in Section 2.2 to verify private shares. In our proposed VSS scheme, the dealer follows Shamir's ( , ) t n SS scheme to select two polynomials and use them to generate one private share and one verification share for each shareholder. Later, shareholders use the linear combination of these two shares can verify the t-consistency of private shares. There is no need to exchange any secret information among shareholders. We propose the following VSS scheme to protect the secret and private shares unconditionally. We assume that the dealer has selected the secret s and generated private shares 1 2 , , , n s s s  for shareholders in the set
t n SS scheme as described in Scheme 1 and distributed each private share to corresponding shareholder secretly. 
Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a novel approach to design an efficient verifiable secret sharing scheme based on Shamir's (t, n) secret sharing scheme. The secret and all shares in our proposed scheme can be protected unconditionally in the verification process.
